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Upshot: Ratcliff’s target article is an insightful introduction to a major corpus, 
the journal comprising the notes of Jean and Valentine Piaget in their studies of 
their three children. These studies were part of a research program in what 
Jean Piaget called “genetic epistemology.” My commentary focuses on a series 
of epistemological issues central to this theory of knowledge. 
1. Marc Ratcliff’s target article is important enough to become seminal. He reminds 
his readers that Jean Piaget’s published studies of infancy were based on a journal 
written jointly with his wife Valentine over seven years, comprising “1,200 pages of 
notebooks along with 10,000 observations and experiments” (§4). These primary 
sources have remained unused since their origination almost a century ago. To my 
knowledge, Ratcliff is the first to make explicit use of this powerful corpus. Thus, my 
first conclusion is that it is good news to see this article published. My second is to add 
the qualification: its current form raises some questions. With a view to promoting the 
former, what now follows is directed on the latter.  
Piaget’s epistemology 
2. An epistemology is a theory of knowledge, and during the 1920s Piaget made clear 
his commitment to an “épistémologie génétique” standardly translated as “genetic 
epistemology.” I follow Piaget in naming this “developmental epistemology” (Smith 
2009a, 2017). My reason is this. 
3. Piaget clarified his interpretation as the denial of metaphysical realism, asserting 
instead that “[the version of constructivism due to Baldwin, Brunschvicg and Piaget 
requires] the rejection of any reality constituted once and for all, such as any fixed 
system of categories, appeal to genesis, interpreted not as origin but as the development 
of operations for the definition of what nature is” (Piaget 1924: 598, my translation).1 
His elegant summary of this interpretation in his Encyclopedia, referred to “[our recent 
work] has provided us with new findings on the formation and development of the 
different types of knowledge” (Piaget 1967: x, my translation).2 Thus, formation and 
development are dual aspects of organisation and ongoing re-organisation of knowing.  
                                                 
1 French original: “rejet de toute réalité constituée une fois pour toutes, de tout système 
fixe de catégories, appel à la genèse (conçue non comme l’origine mais comme le 
développement) des opérations pour en définir la nature, etc.” 
2 French original:  “[…] nous ont fourni des séries de données nouvelles sur la 
formation et le développement des connaissances.” 
4. The opening line of his first infancy book raised the question central to 
intelligence, “the question of the relationships between reason and biological 
organisation” (Piaget 1953: 1, my translation correcting the published translation).3 
Following James Baldwin and Léon Brunschvicg, Piaget’s main argument was that, 
from infant to savant, all knowledge is organised and re-organised through its rational 
formation that enables its development to become more powerful knowledge. His 
epistemology is “historico-critical,” historical in tracking any category or structure 
through time, and critical in that subtle distinctions must be respected in identifying 
different kinds of organisation as knowledge-so-and-so, not as knowledge-such-and-
such. Thus, a critique is comparable to a philosophical analysis combined with 
experimental control whereby normative principles and empirical evidence are 
systematically and comprehensively analysed and evaluated in their current use.  
5. Two conclusions follow on. One is that no epistemology is reducible to 
psychology. Indeed, psychologism is the fallacy of reducing norms to facts (Frege 1964; 
Smith 2006; cf. Piaget 1953). The other is that no epistemology should be ignored in a 
psychology providing evidence for/against its normative positions. Piaget accepted both 
conclusions. Yet the marginalisation of Piaget’s epistemology is standard in most 
psychological commentary ostensibly on it, thereby converging on psychologism. 
Ratcliff notes this common practice, and could make more use of the journal to augment 
its epistemic insights. 
Methodology and methods 
6. Karl Popper (2012) regarded the terms methodology and epistemology to be 
synonymous, notably in evaluating the competing merits of verificationism and 
falsificationism in the pursuit of knowledge. He argued that knowledge is impossible to 
verify in contrast to the falsification of mistaken hypotheses, the latter being the proper 
business of science. Piaget used the term methodology in this sense, since the epistemic 
standing of children’s thinking is central to his focus. He followed Pierre Duhem in 
regarding truth and necessity as the two poles of knowledge. Knowing has a truth-value 
necessitating its compatibility with any other truth. Thinking devoid of truth-value falls 
between these poles. As a boy, I thought that New York is the capital of the United 
States. But I did not know this because it is false. Claiming to know and knowing are 
not the same thing. Piaget’s methodology requires this distinction to be respected. By 
contrast, the common practice in psychology is to refer to methodology as a synonym of 
a method used even in an experiment with scant relevance to the knowledge of its 
participants. 
7. From 1922 onwards, Piaget declared that his empirical studies are “experiments,” 
and used three different kinds. (a) Fully controlled experiments in his studies of 
perception (Piaget 1961). (b) Epistemically constrained experiments in his clinical 
method directed on different kinds of belief (Piaget 1926: 11, 1929: 10f). He used this 
                                                 
3 French original: “La question des rapports entre la raison et l’organisation biologique” 
(Piaget 1936: 8). 
clinical method  pace the mistranslation on page 9 three lines up from bottom which 
should read “clinical” not “critical”) in his studies published in French during the 1920s. 
(c) He added further epistemic constraints in his revision of what he called “[c]ette 
‘méthode critique’ [this ‘critical method’]” (Piaget 1947: 7, my translation; cf. Smith 
1993: 57). One constraint is experimental control of participants’ practical knowledge: 
knowing how is a pre-condition of knowing that. Another is the focus on operational 
thought central to knowing why.4 Piaget introduced this method in his infancy studies 
during 1925–1932, and from 1941 onwards in children’s conservation and similar 
studies. Notice four things:  
 (a) Piaget attests his knowledge of the major method used in empirical sciences, 
and so (b) and (c) reflect a deliberate choice.  
 Ethical constraints are widely agreed to require respect in science. Piaget was 
arguing that epistemic constraints should also be respected in what he called 
“Studies in Child Logic … [directed on] the formation of logical norms” (Piaget 
1959: xx–xxii, v, my translation).5  
 Piaget followed Henri Bergson in regarding knowledge as “the creation of the 
absolutely new.” That is why his focus was on “construction … [giving children] 
new ‘powers’ that enrich their knowledge of objects” (Piaget 1978: 650). But 
Ratcliff merges (b) and (c), or at least does too little to disambiguate that 
misleading and widely used expression “Piaget’s clinical-critical method.”  
 In view of the negative dismissal of (c) in psychological commentary, the journal 
could be used to check the reliability and validity of the protocols already reported 
in Piaget’s infancy books. Are the published protocols trustworthy as evidence? 
Are they sound as the grounds of different kinds of knowledge? 
Body 
8. Piaget of course accepted that embodiment makes a core contribution to stating the 
mind-body problem. He argued for the parallelism of mind and body, each identifiable 
through a dominant relation, implication and causality respectively (Piaget 1966). 
Bergson (1907) had identified instinct and intelligence as dominant organs of life. 
Piaget complained that Bergson had inadequately clarified how the causal organisation 
of bodily based instinctive actions evolve into the implicatory organisation of mental 
acts of rational intelligence − revisit the earlier quotation from his first infancy book. 
9. Embodiment makes a core contribution to Piaget’s account of knowledge. Ratcliff 
attests this in his use of the hitherto “unknown” journal, adding that it offers 
                                                 
4 See Q12 in “Jean Piaget interviewed in February 1980 by Gilbert Voyat, with the 
assistance of and a paper by Bärbel Inhelder,” (translation, preface and notes by Leslie 
Smith), 
http://www.fondationjeanpiaget.ch/fjp/site/textes/VE/JP80_Voyat_interview.pdf 
5 French original: “Études sur la logique de l’enfant […] sur le développement des 
normes logiques” (Piaget 1923: 3–5) 
perspectives on “self-cognition of the body, i.e., the child’s knowledge of her body, as 
either a curious object or her own body” (Abstract). Agreed, this is a valid issue. But 
epistemic problems are waiting in the wings. One: is self-cognition self-knowledge? 
Not all cognition has a truth-value, at least not in cognitive psychology addressing 
problems of perception and learning. Two: if self-cognition is knowledge, is it practical 
knowledge or conceptual knowledge? This question is important because Piaget 
explicitly noted that, despite being embodied, activity in infancy is confined to practical 
knowledge, that is, “sensori-motor intelligence is limited to wanting success or practical 
adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state 
truths” (Piaget 1954: 360, my translation).6 Three: in general, Piaget’s unit of analysis is 
intentional action, i.e., action directed on a goal recognisable in the conscious awareness 
of its agent. This admission is central to his main problem, the development of 
necessary knowledge. Since infants’ knowledge is practical, its modal character cannot 
be expressed other than as a behavioral success/failure in attaining its goal. Four: the 
step from embodied cognition to behavioral neuroscience is not taken by Ratcliff, but it 
is made by others (Changeux 2010; McCulloch & Pitts 1943). Piaget had strong 
arguments against taking this step. A suitable precaution is for Ratcliff to present a 
clarifying analysis. Does the journal include any pointers for/against this? 
Necessity and rationality 
10. Piaget identified the formation and development of necessary knowledge as a 
major problem in his epistemology (references in Smith 1993: 1, 2009a: 69). His final 
paper outlined a novel way forward: 
 “There are implications between actions or operations as such; these implications both lie 
beneath and precede implications between statements (propositions); and they constitute the 
essential driving force of cognitive, and in particular dialectical, constructions” (Piaget 2006: 
5). 
11. Implications have logical attributes, notably their necessity based on reasons. Yet 
prelinguistic infants capable of making logical inferences can express neither necessity 
nor reasons. Does the journal contain any anticipations throwing light on a 
constructivist resolution of these issues?  
Mistranslation in English texts 
12. Alas, this is rampant, and of course Ratcliff cannot redress it. What he can do in his 
article is to quote key French terms along with their English counterparts. For example, 
English scheme does not mean French schème, which does not mean schema in 
Immanuel Kant’s sense from which Piaget gained his inspiration (Smith 2009b). 
Ratcliff is well aware that Piaget wrote mainly in French, and he invites Piaget’s readers 
to revisit what he thoughtfully calls the “classic texts,” i.e., texts providing new insights 
                                                 
6 French original: “l’intelligence sensori-motorice se borne à vouloir la réussite ou 
l’adaptation pratique, tandis que la pensée verbale or conceptuelle a pour fonction de 
connaître et d’énoncer des vérités” (Piaget 1937: 316). 
on their re-reading. Yes, indeed! This is a compelling reason for reading Piaget, 
preferably in French, and for re-reading Piaget.  
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